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Comment
The Enforcement of Cohabitation
Agreements: Theories of Recovery
for the Meretricious Spouse
I. INTRODUCTION
The family is the basic unit of American society. Our present-
day notion of family is one which has evolved over time and varied
across civilizations. Marriage is the foundation of the family and,
as such, is accorded special recognition and protection by our legal
system. While the legal incidents of marriage have been defined
differently in past years,' the state has always been a "silent part-
ner in every wedding of a woman and a man."2
Although the prevalence of divorce in this country3 has gener-
ated public concern about the instability of modern-day American
marriages,4 approximately two-thirds of all adults in the United
States today are married and living with their spouses.5 This tends
to support the view that marriage, as a social and legal institution,
is still very much alive.6
Because of the importance of marriage in our society, the mari-
tal relation is accorded legal status. Individuals assume special le-
gal obligations upon acquiring marital status7 and are afforded
special protections upon the dissolution of the union.8
Regardless of the popularity of marriage and its social and legal
1. For a discussion of the rights and obligations of married couples in the 19th
century, see generally T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME (3d ed. 1862).
2. H. BASS & M. REIN, DIVORCE OR MARRIAGE, A LEGAL GUIDE 2-3 (1976).
3. In 1975, for example, there were more divorces than new marriages. Id. at 3.
4. Recent statistics demonstrate that over 35% of marriages end in divorce
within 10 years. Id.
5. Shaffer, Marriage: Changing Institution, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 36 (1973). The number of marriages is in part attrib-
utable to the popularity of remarriage. Id. at 37.
6. H. GRUNEBAUM & J. CHRIST, CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE: STRUCTURE, DYNAM-
ICS, AND THERAPY 1 (1976). The authors note that although people today tend
to marry later in life than did men and women 20 years ago, "they still marry
in overwhelming numbers, and they marry again and again." Id.
7. See notes 14-19 & accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 14-19 & accompanying text infra.
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endorsement, some men and women have chosen to cohabit with-
out legally assuming the marital status and its corresponding du-
ties and privileges. The tendency of couples to cohabit without
legal marriage has been increasing in recent years.9 Many of these
relationships are stable family ones of long duration,10 appearing
in many respects like lawful marital relationships. However, the
lack of a formal, legally binding commitment distinguishes the
nonmarital from the marital relationship, and the unmarried
couple does not legally assume the mutual rights and obligations
which apply to the married couple under state law."
As the tendency of couples to cohabit outside of marriage in-
creases, so do social and legal concerns. Of particular concern to
the legal system is how to define the rights of unmarried
cohabitors to the property acquired by either or both of the parties
during the relationship. The developing law should seek to en-
hance wise social policies by balancing society's need to encourage
9. As of March, 1978, there were over one million unmarried couples living to-
gether in the United States. Lorio, Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Pro-
posal For a More Perfect Union, 26 Loy. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980). The rapid growth
in the number of nonmarital relationships has apparently been within the
last 20 years. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of couples who cohabited
outside of marriage increased 800%. Rhine & Staubus, Workers Compensa-
tion and The Meretricious Spouse: Sixty-Two Years of Irreconciliable Differ-
ences, 15 CAL_ W. REv. 1, 18 (1979).
10. Many of the cases concerning the rights of meretricious spouses involve rela-
tionships of over 10 years duration. See, e.g., Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley,
504 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1972) (19 years); Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256
P.2d 712 (1953) (33 years); Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329,21 Cal.
Rptr. 593 (1962) (18 years); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247 P.2d
19 (1952) (16 years); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932) (11
years); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975) (12
years); Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 243 P.2d 561 (Cal. App. 1952) (14
years); Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) (18 years); Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (15 years); Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me.
162, 13 A. 583 (1888) (13 years); West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 230
N.W.2d 545 (1975) (13 years); Joan S. v. John S., -N.H. -, 427 A.2d 498 (1981)
(16 years); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207 (1950) (24 years); Koz-
lowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (15 years); Crowe v. De
Gioia, 179 N.J. Super. 36, 430 A-2d 251 (1981) (20 years); Morone v. Morone, 50
N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980) (23 years); McCullon v. McCullon, 96 Misc.
2d 962, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (28 years); Marum v. Marum, 21 Misc.
2d 474, 194 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (17 years); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or.
421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976) (19 years); Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554
P.2d 1057 (1976) (15 years); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d
864 (1972) (16 years); Omerv. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386,523 P.2d 957 (1974) (20
years); Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12 (1949) (11 years). Note that
when compared to the present duration of many legal marriages, see note 4
supra, at least some of the nonmarital relationships are more stable.
11. However, the nonmarital spouses may have the same rights and obligations
as to children born of the union. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979).
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legal marriage with the individual's need for equitable results.
This Comment will explore the developing legal protections avail-
able in nonmarital relationships, and the corresponding problems
and public policy concerns arising from the legal recognition, and
nonrecognition, of the property rights of unmarried cohabitors.
I1. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE LEGAL DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN MARRIED SPOUSES, PUTATIVE
SPOUSES, AND MERETRICIOUS SPOUSES
In order to promote public policies regarding marriage,
lawmakers have created legal distinctions between the property
rights of cohabiting couples depending upon the classification of
the relationship. These distinctions become significant if one of
the cohabitors dies or if the couple decides to terminate the rela-
tionship. In either event, the definition of the couple's legal status
largely governs whether state inheritance laws or marriage and di-
vorce acts apply in determining the rights of the parties.
There are three classifications of relationships which define the
legal status of a man and a woman who live together as spouses:
legally married spouses, putative spouses, and meretricious12
spouses. The distinctions between these three classifications are
important, as each carries with it differing potential property rights
of the parties. 13
Legally married spouses are those who are considered to be
married under the laws of the state.14 The marital relation and its
incidents are largely defined by statute.'5 An agreement between
legally married persons to change the statutory incidents of mar-
riage is void and unenforceable on public policy grounds.16 Such
an agreement may also be unenforceable for failure of considera-
tion, as the spouses have pre-existing statutory duties to one an-
other.i7 Thus, while the marital contract is voluntarily assumed
12. The term "meretricious" is defined as "[o]f the nature of unlawful sexual
connection. The term is descriptive of the relation sustained by persons wh6
contract a marriage that is void by reason of legal incapacity." BLACK's LAW
DIcnoN--Y 1140 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
13. Comment, Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants-A Proposal, 14 CAT
WL. REV. 485, 487 (1979).
14. Comment, That Was No Wife, That Was My Lady: Is Marvin v. Marvin Ap-
propriate For Kentucky?, 66 KY. L.J. 707, 707 (1977-78).
15. H. BASS & M. REIN, supra note 2, at 2.
16. Hunter, Essay On Contract and Status: Race, Marriage, and the Meretricious
Spouse, 64 VA. L RIv. 1039, 1067-69 (1978). However, the author noted that
express contracts between married persons concerning a subject outside of
the marital relationship may be enforceable. Id. at 1070-71.
17. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAlIF. L.
REv. 1169, 1259-60 (1974). Weitzman noted that particularly those contracts
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by husband and wife, it may also be considered publicly imposed,
because of the inability of the parties to significantly alter their
statutory rights and obligations.18 The marital relationship is con-
sequently viewed as a status-contract, due to the state's third-
party interest in the marriage agreement.
Public policy considerations play an important role in defining
the legally binding rights and obligations which are assumed by
parties entering into a marital relationship. Certain public poli-
cies, such as promoting the stability of relationships, the proper
care of children, and the duties of support, can be enhanced by
statutory manipulation of the parties' rights and obligations during
marriage and upon termination of the relationship. Among the
rights and obligations of married couples are: (1) the right to live
together in marital cohabitation, (2) the power to confer legiti-
macy on children, (3) the assumption of mutual obligations of
marital and child support, (4) the power to declare a marital
homestead, (5) the right to file joint income tax returns, (6) the
right to legal redress against third parties who interfere with the
marital relationship, (7) the rights to spousal and child support
and child custody upon the termination of the marriage, and
(8) the right to claim certain benefits and interests upon the death
of a spouse, including family and homestead allowances, wrongful
death damages, and government benefits.19
A second type of spousal relationship is that involving the puta-
tive spouse. A putative spouse is a person who erroneously, but
reasonably and in good faith, believed himself to be validly mar-
ried under the laws of the state.20 Some states have statutorily
recognized the rights of putative spouses in property acquired dur-
ing the relationships.2 1 Other states have recognized the property
rights of putative spouses by case law.22 Putative spouses have
which attempt to limit the sexual relations of the parties or the spousal duty
of support are illegal on public policy grounds. Id. at 1260.
18. See Hunter, supra note 16, at 1067. Hunter concluded that because the state
has a strong interest in the continued stability of marital relations, the state
has an interest in defining those relations. Id. at 1068-69.
19. Kay & Anyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALm. L. REV. 937,
939-40 (1977).
20. Id. at 940-41; Comment, supra note 14, at 707.
21. See, e.g., CAT_ CiV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-111
(1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-1-404 (1979).
22. See Albae v. Harbin, 249 Ala. 201, 30 So. 2d 459 (1947); Sclamberg v.
Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 P.
241 (1885); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 198 Md. 341, 84 A.2d 89 (1951); Batty v.
Greene, 206 Mass. 561, 92 N.E. 715 (1910); Allen v. Allen, 47 Mich. 74, 10 N.W.
113 (1881); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 52 So. 2d 624 (1951); Reed
v. Reed, 516 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App. 1974); Fowler v. Fowler, 97 N.H. 216, 84 A.2d
836 (1951); Conkling v. Conkling, 126 N.J. Eq. 142, 8 A.2d 298 (1936); Lawrence
19821
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also been accorded other types of rights traditionally reserved for
only legally married spouses.23
In contrast to the putative spouse, a meretricious spouse is one
who is a party to a marital-like relationship where both parties
know they are not validly married.2 4 Traditionally, the parties to
this type of relationship have been barred from enforcing property
rights in court, due to the "illicit" nature of their relationship. 25 On
the breakup of the relationship (or its termination by the death of
one of the spouses), the law generally left these parties where they
found themselves based on the rationale that any agreements be-
tween the parties concerning property rights were unenforceable
and void on public policy grounds. This refusal to recognize con-
tractual agreements between unmarried, non-putative cohabitors
is generally known as the "meretricious spouse rule."
Under the meretricious spouse rule, the court presumes that
any contract between unmarried couples is tainted by the illicit
sexual relations of the parties. The illicit sexual services by the
meretricious spouse are presumed to constitute part of the consid-
eration exchanged for the contract rights. Therefore, because of
the illegality of the consideration, the contract is rendered void
and unenforceable. 2 6
v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950); Walker v. Walker, 84 N.E.2d 258
(Ohio C.P. 1948); Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088 (1920); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96
P. 1079 (1908); Philips v. Philips, 106 W. Va. 105, 144 S.E. 875 (1928); Siskoy v.
Siskoy, 250 Wis. 435, 27 N.W.2d 488 (1947).
The property rights of putative spouses arise regardless of the spouse's
proportional contribution to the acquisition of the property. Comment, supra
note 14, at 709.
23. See, e.g., Adduddell v. Board of Administration, Pub. Employees Retirement
Sys., 8 Cal. App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970) (the right to workmen's com-
pensation and retirement fund); Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 332
P.2d 773 (1958) (the right to sue for the wrongful death of a spouse); In re
Krone's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d 741 (1948) (the right to a share of
the spouse's property upon death).
24. Comment, supra note 14, at 707.
25. See, e.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962);
Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
However, there has been a tendency to allow enforcement of workmen's
compensation claims by unmarried cohabitors upon the death of their mere-
tricious spouses, by considering them to be "de facto" spouses under state
compensation laws. See, e.g. Burgess Constr. Co. v. Lindley, 504 P.2d 1023
(Alaska 1972); Kendell v. Housing Auth., 196 Md. 370, 76 A.2d 767 (1950); West
v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 230 N.W.2d 545 (1975); Parkinson v. J.&S.
Tool Co., 64 N.J. 159, 313 A.2d 609 (1974). Oregon allows a meretricious spouse
to recover workmen's compensation if there are children born of the union
and the parties have lived together at least one year. See OF. REv. STAT.
§ 656.226 (1979).
26. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1091.
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III. LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF THE "MERETRICIOUS
SPOUSE RULE"
The case of Creasman v. Boyle27 illustrates the application of
the meretricious spouse rule to deny property rights asserted by
an unmarried cohabitor. In Creasman, the plaintiff sued to estab-
lish title to real property following the death of his meretricious
spouse. Mr. Creasman and Mrs. Paul cohabited for seven years
prior to Mrs. Paul's death and purchased a home under an install-
ment land contract during their cohabitation. All payments under
the contract were made by Mr. Creasman; however, the deed to the
property was executed solely to Mrs. Paul. Because the plaintiff
provided the consideration for the purchase of the property, he
claimed relief under a resulting trust theory.28 The court denied
relief, finding the resulting trust doctrine inapplicable where the
property accumulated by the meretricious spouses "was all ac-
quired during and in pursuance of their meretricious relation-
ship. '2 9 Thus, the meretricious spouse rule effected the result that
property acquired by an unmarried couple while living together le-
gally belonged to the party who had legal title upon termination of
the relationship.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of cases examining the ef-
fect of the meretricious spouse rule on cohabitors' property rights
is In re Marriage of Cary.3O In Cary, a man and a woman cohab-
ited for eight years without marrying. Their relationship was out-
wardly similar to a traditional marriage. The man worked outside
of the home and the woman performed household services. Four
children were born of the union.
The court held that the meretricious spouse rule should not be
used to bar the application of state laws governing marital prop-
erty rights to unmarried, cohabiting couples.3 1 As a result, all
property accumulated during the relationship was to be equally di-
vided. In deciding that the relationship should be treated as a le-
gal marriage for purposes of property division, the court stated:
By the Family Law Act the Legislature has announced it to be the pub-
lic policy of this state that concepts of "guilt"... and "innocence" are no
longer relevant in the determination of family property rights, whether
27. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
28. Generally, if property is put in the name of someone other than the person
who provides the consideration for the purchase of the property, a resulting
trust arises in favor of the person who provided the consideration. For a dis-
cussion of the resulting trust doctrine and its application in suits by meretri-
cious spouses, see notes 87-94 & accompanying text infra.
29. 31 Wash. 2d at 353, 196 P.2d at 839.
30. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). For a discussion of Cary, see
Comment, supra note 13, at 492-93; Comment, supra note 14, at 711.
31. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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there be a legal marriage or not, and, if not, regardless of whether the defi-
ciency is known to one, or both, or neither of the parties. 32
The California Supreme Court, in Marvin v. Marvin,33 took a
compromise approach in addressing the applicability of the mere-
tricious spouse rule in a property dispute between unmarried
cohabitors. In Marvin, a woman sued a man with whom she had
lived for seven years without marrying. The plaintiff sought to en-
force an oral contract, claiming a contractual right to one-half of
the property accumulated by the defendant during the
relationship.
The court rejected the Cary rationale3 4 as a basis for recovery
and expressly stated that the California Family Law Act did not
govern the distribution of property acquired by unmarried
cohabitors during their relationship. 35 Therefore, the Marvin court
refused to accord marital status to the meretricious relationship
and grant unmarried cohabitors rights identical to married or pu-
tative spouses under California law.3 6 However, the court also re-
jected the Creasman approach of applying the meretricious
spouse rule so as to totally bar recovery.3 7
In contrast to the two extreme positions reflected in Cary and
Creasman, the Marvin court held that the meretricious spouse
could recover by establishing an express oral agreement between
the parties.3 8 Recovery was limited, however, to that portion of the
contract which was not based upon meretricious sexual services.
In dicta, the court suggested other theories, such as implied con-
tract, partnership or joint venture, quantum meruit, or construc-
tive and resulting trust doctrines, upon which a meretricious
spouse could base recovery.3 9 Presumably, the California
Supreme Court will at least entertain suits based on these theo-
ries, to the extent that sexual services do not form the considera-
tion for the right of recovery.40
32. Id. at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
33. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
34. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1083; Comment, supra note 14, at 712.
35. 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d at 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829. See Kay & Amyx, supra
note 19, at 958; Comment, supra note 13, at 496-97; Comment, supra note 14, at
713.
36. See Lorio, supra note 9, at 20.
37. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. For a discussion of
Creasman, see notes 27-29 & accompanying text supra.
38. 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
39. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. For a discussion of these
theories, see notes 75-102 & accompanying text infra.
40. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1084.
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IV. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
There are several potential juridical bases for the legal asser-
tion of property rights by unmarried cohabitors.41 Among the pos-
sible theories of recovery are: (1) a legal equivalence to marital
status;42 (2) an express oral agreement;43 (3) an express written
agreement;44 (4) a contract implied-in-fact, including a contract for
services and partnership or resulting trust theories;45 and (5) a
contract implied-in-law, including quantum meruit or constructive
trust theories.4 6
A. Marital Status
A marital status theory of recovery would afford the meretri-
cious spouse recovery under, and in accordance with, state laws
defining the property rights of legally married spouses. Under this
theory, upon termination of the nonmarital relationship, the state
statutes governing the division of marital property would govern
the property rights of an unmarried, cohabiting couple. Thus, the
property rights which married and putative 47 spouses now enjoy
would be extended to include meretricious spouses.
As indicated above, the theory of "marital status" has been re-
jected by the California Supreme Court.48 Other states have also
expressly refused to recognize that property rights of meretricious
spouses derived from state laws applicable to marital relation-
ships. 49 An important result of such a determination is that the
41. Zuckerman, Formality and the Family--Reform and Status Quo, 96 L.Q. REV.
248, 252 (1980).
42. See notes 47-54 & accompanying text infra.
43. See notes 55-72 & accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 73-74 & accompanying text infra.
45. See notes 75-94 & accompanying text infra.
46. See notes 95-102 & accompanying text infra.
47. In many states, putative spouses have rights to share in their spouse's prop-
erty, despite the invalidity of the marriage. See notes 21-23 & accompanying
text supra.
48. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). In
Marvin, the court held that the Family Law Act did not govern distribution of
property acquired during a nomnarital relationship. See note 35 & accompa-
nying text supra. Earlier California decisions had applied the California
Community Property Act to the division of property between meretricious
spouses. See Estate of Atherley, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975);
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). But see
Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329,21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962); Vallera v.
Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App.
3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975) (all holding the provisions of the Family Act
inapplicable to the meretricious relationship).
49. See, e.g., Joan S. v. John S., - NIL -, 427 A.2d 498 (1981); Crowe v. De Gioia,
179 NJ. Super. 36,430 A.2d 251 (1981); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196
P.2d 835 (1948). The Creasman court stated-
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meretricious spouse is unable to claim alimony upon dissolution of
the relationship5 0 or to recover attorneys' fees.5 1
Although commentators have suggested that state legislatures
should expand the laws governing marital relationships to deal
with the property rights of unmarried cohabitors, 52 no state to date
has done so.5 3 Therefore, the current status of the law is that mari-
tal property acts are not applicable to the division of property of
meretricious spouses.
It has been declared to be a rule of law in this state that property
acquired by a man and a woman not married to each other, but living
together as husband and wife, is not community property, and, in the
absence of some trust relation, belongs to the one in whose name the
legal title to the property stands.
31 Wash. 2d at 351, 196 P.2d at 838 (emphasis in original). Accord, Hinkle v.
McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978); In re Estate of Thornton, 81
Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). Although in both of these cases, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that the state laws governing marital property
rights did not apply to meretricious spouses, one commentator noted that the
Thornton decision indicated the court's willingness to impose a marital-like
status for the purpose of dividing property interests between partners who
have a serious and intimate relationship. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1088.
50. In Davis v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 261, 366 N.E.2d 752 (1977), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court refused to recognize the right of a meretricious spouse to ali-
mony, stating: "Cohabitation within this commonwealth, in the absence of a
formal solemnization of marriage, does not create the relationship of hus-
band and wife. Without the existence of a marriage relation, a woman has no
right to receive support." Id. at 262, 366 N.E.2d at 754. See also Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979). But see McCullon v. McCullon, 96
Misc. 2d 962, 973-74, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 232-33 (Sup. Ct. 1978), where the court
suggested in dictum that statutes governing the marital division of property
may apply to the division of property between meretricious spouses where
the relationship is of long duration and is, in all outward appearances, similar
to a traditional marriage.
51. See, e.g., Crowe v. De Gioia, 179 N.J. Super. 36, 430 A.2d 251 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 505-08. The author suggested extending
the Family Law Acts by amending them to include unmarried cohabitors if
they have an ostensible marriage relationship and an actual family
relationship.
53. However, the New Hampshire legislature has protected meretricious spouses
from disinheritance by cohabitors where the parties lived together for the
three years preceding the death of the cohabitor. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 457:39 (1968).
In states where common-law marriages are legally recognized, the rela-
tionship of the unmarried cohabitors may constitute a legally valid marriage
so that the rules of marriage, along with the attendant property rights, would
apply. See Lorio, supra note 9, at 19. However, in order to contract a com-
mon-law marriage, the following elements must exist: (1) there must be a
present understanding that the parties are husband and wife, (2) the parties
must assume the marriage relation with the intent to continue it throughout
their lives, and (3) the parties must in good faith believe that they are hus-
band and wife and hold themselves out as such. See Bracken v. Bracken, 45
S.D. 430, 433, 188 N.W. 46, 46 (1922).
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Several arguments support the continuation of this policy. In
view of the apparent intent of meretricious spouses to not marry,
the imposition of a marital status on such relationships would run
counter to the intentions of the parties in most instances. Al-
though the creation of status-rights may result in more certainty, it
may also be contrary to the public policy of encouraging legal mari-
tal unions. By endowing a nonmarital relationship with marital
rights, the state would remove one important incentive to marry.
Such an action would also, in effect, constitute a reinstatement of
common-law marriage since the rights of the parties would be en-
forced due to their status.
An alternative to equating the meretricious relationship with
legal marriage could be the state imposition of a different status on
the relationship. However, as one commentator noted, it would be
difficult to define a new status for nonmarital cohabitation that
would "sit comfortably with the definition of marriage."54 Such
state action could result in a hierarchy of types of marriages, with
resulting confusion in the law and, perhaps, injustice to the
parties.
B. Express Oral Agreement
In many instances in which a meretricious spouse has sought
recovery, the basis for the suit has been an alleged express oral
agreement asserted against a cohabitor 55 or against a cohabitor's
estate.56 This theory of recovery has been applied in attempts to
54. Zuckerman, supra note 41, at 278.
55. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698,12 P.2d 430 (1932); Feldman v. Nassi,
111 Cal. App. 3d 881, 169 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1980); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App.
3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 ]1l. 2d 49, 397 N.E.2d 1204
(1979); Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 251 N.W.2d 606 (1977); Kinke-
non v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981); Warren v. Warren, 94 Nev. 309,
579 P.2d 772 (1978); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979);
Crowe v. De Gioja, 179 N.J. Super. 36, 430 A.2d 251 (1981); Morone v. Morone,
50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d
144 (1976); Ireland v. Flanagan, 51 Or. App. 837, 627 P.2d 496 (1981); Mullen v.
Suchko, - Pa. Super. -, 421 A.2d 310 (1980); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405
(Utah 1977).
This theory of recovery has also been used by and against a paramour,
where the parties have not actually cohabited. See, e.g., Cougler v. Fackler,
510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974); Naimo v. La Fianza, 146 N.J. Super. 362, 369 A.2d 987
(Ch. Div. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Hill v. West-
brook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247 P.2d 19 (1952); Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Natl
Bank, 243 P.2d 561 (Cal. App. 1952); Williams v. Payne, 515 S.W.2d 618 (Ky.
1974); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Gauthier
v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207 (1950); Bridgman v. Stout, 10 Or. App. 474, 500
P.2d 731 (1972).
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recover property of the cohabitor5 7 or the reasonable value of serv-
ices rendered 58 or both.59 Under this theory of recovery, the prop-
erty rights of unmarried cohabitors derive solely from the
contractual intent of the parties and not their status under state
law;60 thus, recognition of those property rights would not consti-
tute a judicial reinstatement of common-law marriage. 61
Actions based upon an express oral agreement have met with
mixed success. 62 There are two hurdles which a plaintiff seeking
recovery on the basis of an express oral agreement must over-
57. See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Marvin v. Mar-
vin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); Trutalli v. Meraviglia,
215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932); Feldman v. Nassi, 111 Cal. App. 3d 881, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1980); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1975); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Williams v. Payne,
515 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1974); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d
595 (1973); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981); Warren v.
Warren, 94 Nev. 309, 579 P.2d 772 (1978); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378,
403 A.2d 902 (1979); Crowe v. De Gioia, 179 N.J. Super. 36, 430 A.2d 251 (1981);
Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Ireland v. Flanagan, 51 Or.
App. 837, 627 P.2d 496 (1981); Bridgman v. Stout, 10 Or. App. 474, 500 P.2d 731
(1972); Mullen v. Suchko, - Pa. Super. -, 421 A.2d 310 (1980); Edgar v. Wag-
ner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977).
58. See, e.g., Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 CaL 2d 458, 247 P.2d 19 (1952); Lovinger
v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 243 P.2d 561 (Cal. App. 1952); Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73
Mich. App. 405,251 N.W.2d 606 (1977); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.L 80,70 A.2d 207
(1950); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Morone v.
Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405
(Utah 1977).
59. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); Edgar v.
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977).
60. For a discussion of contract versus status conflicts in the context of spousal
relations, see Hunter, supra note 16, at 1039.
61. But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979), in which the
court equated a recognition of property rights of a meretricious spouse based
on contract to a judicial recognition of common-law marriage. The court
failed to acknowledge the distinction between property rights based on con-
tract and property rights based on a legally valid marriage. See notes 115-21 &
accompanying text infra. It has been stated that the Hewitt court viewed the
recognition of contract rights of cohabitors as an equivalent to conferring a
legal status on the meretricious relationship. S. KATz & M. INKER, FATHERS,
HUSBANDS AND LOVERS: LEGAL RIGHTS & RESPONSMIrrIs 531 (1979).
62. For cases where a cohabitor was successful in a suit based on an express oral
agreement, see Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932); Tyranski v. Pig-
gins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698,
301 N.W.2d 77 (1981); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979);
Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d
405 (Utah 1977).
For cases in which recovery based on an express oral agreement was de-
nied, see Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953); Hill v. West-
brook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247 P.2d 19 (1952); Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 M1L 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d
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come. First, the plaintiff must be able to show sufficient evidence
that there was actually an express agreement between the parties.
The plaintiff may have difficulty establishing the existence of such
an agreement.6 3 Where services have been performed in the con-
text of an intimate relationship, it may be assumed that the serv-
ices were rendered gratuitously, without expectation of payment.64
Therefore, the plaintiff must establish that the services were actu-
ally performed in consideration for the cohabitor's promise of
property rights or payment.
Even if the plaintiff establishes the existence of a contractual
arrangement, recovery may be denied on the ground that the con-
tract is unenforceable because it falls within the Statute of
Frauds65 or because it would be contrary to state public policy to
enforce it.66 This latter rationale stems from the concern that a
1204 (1979); Williams v. Payne, 515 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1974); Warren v. Warren,
94 Nev. 309, 579 P.2d 772 (1978); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.J. 80,70 A.2d 207 (1950).
63. For cases where recovery was denied because of a lack of evidence of an ex-
press oral agreement, see Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1975); Williams v. Payne, 515 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1974); Warren v. War-
ren, 94 Nev. 309, 579 P.2d 772 (1978).
64. See Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 CaL 2d 458, 461, 247 P.2d 19, 21 (1952).
65. Although this argument may be raised, part performance by the plaintiff
would take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. Kinkenon v. Hue, 207
Neb. 698, 704, 301 N.W.2d 77,81 (1981). But see Bridgman v. Stout, 10 Or. App.
474, 500 P.2d 731 (1972), where the court held that the Statute of Frauds
barred recovery on an oral promise to convey property.
Minnesota recently enacted a Statute of Frauds provision which is specifi-
cally directed toward the enforceability of contracts between unmarried
cohabitors. MmN. STAT. § 513.075 (Cur. Supp. 1980) provides as follows:
If sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a con-
tract between a man and a woman who are living together in this
state out of wedlock, or who are about to commence living together in
this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms concerning the
property and financial relations of the parties only if
(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties, and
(2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.
66. See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331,256 P.2d 712 (1953); Hewitt v. Hew-
itt, 77 1ll. 2d 49,394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207
(1950).
The Minnesota legislature has declared that any contract between unmar-
ried cohabitors which is not in writing and signed by the parties shall be
deemed contrary to public policy and unenforceable. The relevant statute
provides:
Unless the individuals have executed a contract complying with
the provisions of section 513.075, the courts of this state are withoutjurisdiction to hear and shall dismiss as contrary to public policy any
claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another individ-
ual if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals have lived
together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock
within or without this state.
MiN. STAT. § 513.076 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See note 65 supra for the text of
Mwn. STAT. § 513.075.
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contract based upon meretricious sexual services is illegal, and
therefore, the meretricious spouse rule completely bars recovery.
Courts which apply this reasoning are those which refuse to view
the contract as severable. 67 Thus, even though only a portion of
the contract may be based on the sexual relations of the parties,
the meretricious spouse rule bars recovery on an express contract
theory because the illicit sexual relations of the parties lends fie-
gality to the entire contract.68
In contrast, where the fiction of severability is applied, the con-
tract between the unmarried cohabitors is divided into enforceable
and unenforceable portions. The meretricious spouse rule only ne-
gates that portion of the contract based upon sexual services.69 By
limiting the application of the meretricious spouse rule, the plain-
tiff is not totally precluded from recovery.70
Of course, even if the fiction of severability is recognized, the
plaintiff will still have the initial burden of proving the existence of
the oral agreement. The plaintiff may also have to demonstrate the
inapplicability of the Statute of Frauds if this defense is raised.71
However, once such burdens are met, the remaining focus would
not be whether the contract was unenforceable on public policy
grounds, but rather, how much of the contract was unenforceable.
Thus, the inquiry would shift from the ability to recover to the
amount of recovery.72
67. In Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 84, 70 A.2d 207, 209 (1950), the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court denied recovery on the ground that the bargain be-
tween the cohabitors was "an entire and indivisible one and ... the
meretricious part is inseparable from the meritorious part."
68. This rationale was applied to deny recovery in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 11. 2d 49,
394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). For a discussion of the Illinois Supreme Court's rea-
soning concerning the severability theory, see Note, Hewitt v. Hewitt-Prop-
erty Rights of Unmarried Cohabitors Upon Dissolution of the Relationship,
1980 U. IL. L.F. 525, 531-32. However, the Hewitt court stated in dictum: "It is
true, of course, that cohabitation by the parties may not prevent them from
forming valid contracts about independent matters, for which it is said the
sexual relations do not form part of the consideration." 77 Ill. 2d at 59, 394
N.E.2d at 1208. While this statement seems to imply that some contracts con-
cerning property rights may be enforceable in Illinois against a nonmarital
cohabitor, it appears from the rest of the opinion that this possibility is fairly
remote. See notes 115-27 & accompanying text infra.
69. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 665, 557 P.2d 106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 819 (1976).
70. Hunter, supra note 16, at 1077. The author statedz "Courts are more likely to
enforce agreements between unmarried couples when they need not pass
any moral judgment on the affair. The doctrine of severability itself provides
a ground for judges to avoid condoning the conduct of the couple." Id. at 1091.
71. See notes 65-66 & accompanying text supra.
72. However, regardless of the proof of an oral agreement, if the entire considera-
tion for the contract is sexual services, the plaintiff will be precluded from
recovery even in jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of severability.
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C. Express Written Agreement
Another alternative for asserting the rights of an unmarried
cohabitor is a suit based on a written contract.73 Of course, this
alternative presupposes that the parties drafted a formal written
contract regarding their respective property rights when they en-
tered into a cohabitation arrangement. Such an occurrence may
be rare. However, the existence of a written contract would add
certainty in defining the expectations of the parties and would
avoid the proof problems which arise with respect to an alleged
oral agreement. Additionally, a written contract would preclude
later arguments that the parties entered into an oral agreement
contrary to the terms of the written contract.74
However, incorporating the terms of the parties' agreement into
a written document does not necessarily ensure that the parties'
rights and expectations under the agreement will be protected.
The enforceability of a written contract in lieu of marriage would
still be subject to question on public policy grounds. For example,
the entire agreement would fail if the court were unwilling to apply
the severability doctrine and allow enforcement of the part of the
contract which was not based upon meretricious sexual considera-
tion. In addition, even where severability is recognized, the writ-
ten contract may fail in part if there is a determination that a
portion of the rights asserted were actually given in consideration
for sexual services. Thus, while the use of a written agreement
would lend greater certainty in establishing the existence and the
extent of the agreement between meretricious spouses, the extent
of recovery in a suit on the written agreement would not necessar-
ily be more predictable than in a suit on an oral agreement.
D. Contracts Implied-In-Fact
In many instances, the recognition of alternative theories to the
express agreement may be essential to adequately protect the
property rights of the meretricious spouse. Because of the diffi-
This is particularly true in the case of noncohabiting sexual partners. See,
e.g., Cougler v. Fackler, 510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974); Naimo v. La Fianza, 146 N.J.
Super. 362, 369 A.2d 987 (Ch. Div. 1976) (where the court denied recovery on
an agreement to make a testamentary gift for the benefit of an illegitimate
child).
73. One commentator suggested that the business partnership under the Uni-
form Partnership Act could provide a suitable model for express agreements
between unmarried cohabitors. Weitzman, supra note 17, at 1255-58.
74. Walzer & Walzer, A Guide to Drafting Non-Marital Partnership Agreements
and Premarital Agreements, in MAL&rr AND NoN-MrrA CoNTRACTS: PRE-
VENTIVE LAW FOR THE FAmIy 23 (J. Krauskopf ed. 1979). The authors empha-
sized that "nonmarital partnership agreements are not a matter of choice but
of necessity if the parties are to avoid later overwhelming claims." Id.
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culty of proving the existence of an express oral agreement,75 a
meretricious spouse may be left without a remedy in the absence
of alternative grounds of recovery. Often cohabitors may simply
fail to expressly agree on the terms of their arrangement,76 result-
ing in possible inequities for one party upon the termination of the
relationship.
As a result, some courts have allowed recovery based upon an
implied-in-fact contract theory.77 This basis of recovery has been
viewed by some to amount to the creation of a marital status for
unmarried cohabitors.7 8 However, the rights of the parties under
the application of this theory are not derived from the state marital
acts, but rather from the reasonable expectations of the parties, as
determined by examining their conduct.79
Implied-in-fact contracts are those which a court may infer by
examining the actions of the parties to it. The types of implied-in-
fact agreements which could be found in the context of a cohabita-
tion arrangement include: (1) implied-in-fact contracts for serv-
ices, (2) implied-in-fact partnership agreements, and (3) implied-
75. See notes 63-64 & accompanying text supra.
76. One commentator posed the following possible reasons for the failure of
cohabitors to enter into express agreements: (1) they are ignorant of the le-
gal consequences of either marriage or nonmarriage, (2) they are under the
assumption that some legal protections are available, or (3) they enter into
the relationship with no thoughts concerning the legal consequences of their
relations. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts On
The Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAm. LQ. 101, 135 (1976). This com-
mentator contended that standards of good faith and fair dealing should be
applied to these relationships to correct inequities arising from the lack of an
express agreement. Id. at 318.
77. In Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
831-32 (1976), the California Supreme Court acknowledged the potential en-
forceability of implied-in-fact agreements between meretricious spouses.
This was the first California decision to do so. Comment, supra note 13, at
497. See, e.g., Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 243 P. 561, 569 (Cal. App.
1952), where the court stated there could be no implied contract between
meretricious spouses. Two commentators noted that the Marvin court stated
that it would allow implied-in-fact remedies based on the presumption that
the parties intended to deal fairly with each other. Levin & Spak, Judicial
Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: A Signal To Purge Marriage From
The Statute of Frauds, 12 CREaIGHON L. REv. 499, 508-09 (1979).
78. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 685-86, 557 P.2d 106, 123-24, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 832-33 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77
Ill. 2d 49, 57-58, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207 (1979). But see Hunter, supra note 16, at
1084-85, where the author noted that allowance of implied contract theories
does not result in a judicial imposition of a marital status on the parties, as
property rights are expressly stated to not be determined by marital property
acts.
79. Comment, supra note 13, at 496-97.
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in-fact resulting trusts.8 0 As with an express agreement between
meretricious spouses, the enforceability of an implied-in-fact
agreement would depend upon the recognition that the portion of
the agreement attributable to the illicit consideration of the sexual
relations is severable from the rest of the agreement.8 1 In that
event, the implied-in-fact agreement would be enforceable to the
extent that sexual services did not constitute the consideration for
the contract.
An implied-in-fact contract for services based upon the conduct
of the cohabiting parties was found by the New York Superior
Court in McCullon v. McCullon.82 In that case, the defendant had
supported the plaintiff for twenty-eight years, during which time
the plaintiff had performed household services and had raised
three children born of the union. The court held that the conduct
of the plaintiff constituted an implied promise to "forbear employ-
ment and provide household services for the defendant over 28
years in consideration for his implied conduct and promise to pro-
vide a home and future support."83
Implied-in-fact partnership and pooling agreements may also
be asserted as a basis for recovery where the parties have cohab-
ited outside of marriage. To prevail on this theory, the cohabitor
must introduce evidence that the parties intended that property
accumulated during the relationship would be jointly owned.8 4
While some jurisdictions have been unwilling to recognize im-
plied-in-fact partnership agreements in nonmarital relationships,
85
others have been willing to allow recovery where the evidence in-
dicated that the parties intended to pool their resources for their
common benefit.8 6
80. For a discussion of these possible remedies, see Bruch, supra note 76, at 299-
305.
81. For a discussion of the severability doctrine in the enforcement of contracts
between meretricious spouses, see notes 67-70 & accompanying text supra.
82. 96 Misc. 2d 962, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
83. Id. at 974, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 233. In light of a recent decision by the New York
Court of Appeals, however, it does not appear that New York courts will con-
tinue to recognize implied-in-fact theories of recovery for meretricious
spouses. See Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980).
84. For cases in which the plaintiff failed to establish an intent to form a partner-
ship arrangement with respect to property held by the defendant or the de-
fendant's estate, see Warren v. Warren, 94 Nev. 309, 579 P.2d 772 (1978);
Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976).
85. See, e.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329,21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962);
Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96,38 N.W.2d 12 (1949). See also Morone v. Morone,
50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980). Although the Morone court dismissed
the plaintiff's cause of action on an implied contract theory, it recognized the
plaintiff's cause of action on an express contract theory. Id. at 486-87, 413
N.E.2d at 1155.
86. See, e.g., Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); Ireland v. Flanagan, 51
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Another implied-in-fact theory of recovery which may be used
by the meretricious spouse is the resulting trust doctrine. This
doctrine has been asserted to recover property accumulated dur-
ing the meretricious relationship which was put solely in the name
of one of the cohabitors.87 In order to recover under the resulting
trust doctrine, the plaintiff must prove that the parties intended
that the property accumulated during the relationship would be
held by one party in trust for the other.88 The plaintiff must also
establish that she contributed toward the accumulation of the
property impressed with the trust.89
In asserting a right to recover property under a resulting trust
theory, the meretricious spouse may have difficulty in establishing
the intent of the parties to create a trust relation. Although, gener-
ally, if property is put in the name of someone other than the per-
son who provided the consideration for it, a resulting trust will
arise in favor of the person who furnished the consideration, 90 the
intimate relationship of the parties may preclude this result.
Some courts have held that there is no inference that meretricious
spouses intend to create a trust relation, and, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, it is presumed that the parties intended to
dispose of the property in the manner in which they did.91
A second problem faced by a meretricious spouse in asserting
property rights on a resulting trust theory is in proving that she
contributed toward the purchase of the property. This may be dif-
ficult for the plaintiff who has contributed nothing in the way of
monetary value toward the purchase price of property but has con-
tributed household services throughout the duration of the rela-
tionship.92 Courts have denied recovery where there was a lack of
Or. App. 837, 627 P.2d 496 (1981); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499
P.2d 864 (1972).
87. See, e.g., Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964); Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d
657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962); Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618,
32 So. 2d 273 (1947); Cluck v. Sheets, 141 Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860 (1943); Hin-
ide v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978); Latham v. Hennessey, 87
Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196
P.2d 835 (1948). This doctrine has also been used in attempts to recover prop-
erty from sexual partners where there has been no cohabitation. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Frost, 202 Neb. 652, 276 N.W.2d 656 (1979); Adams v. Jensen-Thomas,
18 Wash. App. 757, 571 P.2d 958 (1977).
88. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 121-22.
89. See id. at 122-23.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Hinkle v. McColn, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978); Latham v.
Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash.
2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
92. One commentator suggested expanding the resulting trust theory to recog-
nize the economic value of the homemaker's services and thereby allowing
relief under these circumstances. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 303-05.
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evidence of the plaintiff's actual monetary contributions toward
the purchase of the property claimed to be impressed with the
trust.9 3 However, where the plaintiff was able to establish an ac-
tual advancement of money to the cohabitor which was used to-
ward the purchase of property, some courts have found that the
property was impressed with a trust in favor of the plaintiff.94
E. Contracts Implied-In-Law
The purpose of agreements implied-in-law is to provide a rem-
edy to avoid inequitable results.95 Recovery is not based upon ac-
tual contractual rights derived from the parties' intent, but rather
on principles of justice based on the circumstances of the case.
The remedies of constructive trust and quantum meruit are avail-
able in some jurisdictions if there has been fraud, overreaching, or
inequitable conduct on the part of the meretricious spouse.96
Although courts may be willing to infer a contractual arrange-
ment between cohabitors where the factual circumstances indicate
that this inference would accord with the parties' apparent intent,
there is a greater reluctance to imply agreements in law where
there is no evidence that the parties ever intended to contract.9 7
Nevertheless, the theories of constructive trust and quantum me-
ruit have been applied in these circumstances in order to prevent
unconscionable results.98
One of the major obstacles to recovery by a meretricious spouse
on a contract implied-in-law theory is the presumption that serv-
ices rendered in an intimate relationship are performed gratui-
93. See, e.g., Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964); Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d
657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
94. See, e.g., Williams v. Bullington, 159 Fla. 618, 32 So. 2d 273 (1947). See also
Cluck v. Sheets, 141 Tex. 219, 171 S.W.2d 860 (1943), where the court held that
although a resulting trust could not arise from payments made after title had
vested, there was an express trust between the cohabitors due to their agree-
ment that the land be taken in one name for the benefit of both. Id. at 222, 171
S.W.2d at 862.
Recovery under a resulting trust theory was allowed by the Nebraska
Supreme Court where the parties had an intimate relationship, but never co-
habited. Taylor v. Frost, 202 Neb. 652, 276 N.W.2d 656 (1979).
95. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 306-08, for a general discussion of implied-in-law
agreements in the meretricious spouse context.
96. See, e.g., Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 393, 523 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1974).
97. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Williams v.
Payne, 515 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1974); Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 251
N.W.2d 606 (1977).
98. See, e.g., Marum v. Marum, 21 Misc. 2d 474, 194 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974). However, the Washing-
ton courts have been unwilling to apply the same equitable remedies where
the parties to an intimate relationship have not cohabited. See Adams v. Jen-
sen-Thomas, 18 Wash. App. 757, 571 P.2d 958 (1977).
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tously.99 This presumption is particularly difficult to overcome
when there is no evidence of a contractual arrangement, and it has
been the basis for denial of recovery for the meretricious spouse in
several cases.100
The presumption that services rendered to a cohabitor are gra-
tuitous is derived from an analogy between the marital relation-
ship and the meretricious one. However, the analogy is not a
sound one. Married couples cannot contract concerning the inci-
dents of the marital relationship and the rights and obligations af-
forded by state law.10 1 The parties to a marital relationship have
voluntarily assumed a legally imposed status, with all of its attend-
ant duties and obligations, including duties to render services to
each other. Under those circumstances, a contract implied-in-law
to pay for services would be inappropriate. In addition, unjust en-
richment does not appear so "unjust" in the context of the marital
relationship, since the married spouse has remedies and protec-
tions under state law.
Unlike the married spouse, the unmarried cohabitor does not
assume legal duties to the other party upon entering into the rela-
tionship. In addition, the unmarried cohabitor does not have the
legal protections of the married spouse under state laws and must
look to contract theories upon which to base the assertion of rights.
Implied-in-law contract theories are therefore much more appro-
priate in the context of nonmarital cohabitation than in the context
of the marital relationship, and the presumption that services are
rendered gratuitously should not be applied to bar recovery by the
meretricious spouse. Allowing recovery based upon an implied-in-
law contract would avoid injustice without sanctioning the meretri-
cious relationship by giving it marital status.l02
99. Levin & Spak, supra note 77, at 507.
100. See, e.g., Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 251 N.W.2d 606 (1977). In
Roznowski, the court held that the trial court erred in granting relief to a
meretricious spouse based on unjust enrichment. The court stated: "In order
to recover, the plaintiff must establish a contract implied in fact. Without
proof of the expectations of the parties, the presumption of gratuity will over-'
come the usual contract implied by law to pay for what is accepted." Id. at
408-09, 251 N.W.2d at 608. See also York v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 544 P.2d 572
(1975).
101. See notes 15-18 & accompanying text supra.
102. But see Hunter, supra note 16, at 1092-93. Hunter argued:
To allow recovery for domestic services on a theory of quantum
meruit in the context of a meretricious affair is to give partners to
such an affair a somewhat different, and perhaps more desirable, sta-
tus than that given to married couples. Normally, quantum meruit is
only available where payment is generally to be expected. In a do-
mestic or family situation, most people do not generally expect that
parties will be paid for doing the ordinary chores of life.... Al-
lowing a quasi-contractual recovery for the monetary value of such
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Although it may be argued that allowing recovery to an unmar-
ried cohabitor on the theory of a contract implied-in-law encour-
ages meretricious relationships by providing rights without proof
of the parties' intentions, it is possible that the opposite may be
true. If a cohabitor realizes that the lack of a legal marriage or an
agreement with the meretricious spouse will not remove the legal
obligations to pay for the benefits received from the relationship,
he may be less likely to view nonmarital cohabitation as a positive
alternative to marriage.
V. AMOUNT OF RECOVERY
If the meretricious spouse is successful in asserting a theory of
recovery, the extent of recovery must be determined. This deter-
mination may be subject to some uncertainty. It is unlikely that
the amount of recovery will be determined by state statutes con-
trolling the division of marital property, as meretricious spouses
do not attain the status of married persons under state law.103
Rather, the extent of recovery will depend upon two factors:
(1) the legal theory used for recovery, and (2) the extent that il-
licit sexual services provided the consideration for the agreement.
The influence of the first factor on the amount of recovery is
apparent. If the basis of the suit is a breach of promise, the
amount of damages awarded should be equivalent to the damages
caused by the breach. If the basis is in quantum meruit, the
amount of recovery should be equivalent to the value of the serv-
ices rendered to the defendant. This factor, therefore, is not the
cause of the uncertainty.
However, the second factor, the limited application of the mere-
tricious spouse rule, injects uncertainty into the amount of recov-
ery. As stated by the Marvin court: "Agreements between
nonmarital partners fail only to the extent that they rest upon a
consideration of meretricious sexual services."104 The application
of the second factor, therefore, results in a severance of the cohabi-
tation agreement into void and enforceable portions by the appli-
cation of the meretricious spouse rule to the portion of the contract
based on sexual services. The amount of recovery will thus de-
pend upon the extent an agreement is based upon a consideration
of sexual services. This determination necessarily will be ex-
services implies... a recognition that the services are beyond the
ordinary call of duty ....
I& (footnotes omitted).
103. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 681, 557 P.2d 106, 120, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815,
829 (1976).
104. Id. at 670-71, 557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
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tremely difficult to make, with the result that recoveries could vary
widely, with possible unjust results.
In many instances, the cohabiting parties have a marital-like re-
lationship, 0 5 with all of the normal attributes of marriage. In addi-
tion to sexual relations, the cohabitation may involve household
services, companionship, child-rearing, etc. It would be relatively
rare that sexual relations were nonexistent in a cohabitation ar-
rangement. It also would be relatively rare that sexual relations
would provide the sole consideration for the arrangement. Yet it is
only at these two ends of the broad spectrum of possible
nonmarital cohabitation arrangements that the parties have any
reasonable certainty as to the extent their agreement would be
voidable by application of the meretricious spouse rule. Thus,
even if the parties to a meretricious relationship entered into an
express agreement at the beginning of their relationship, they
could not be certain of their legal rights upon the termination of
the relationship.
This uncertainty of recovery may promote the public policy of
encouraging marriage. If parties are allowed to outline their legal
rights and obligations at the beginning of a meretricious relation-
ship, nonmarital cohabitation could well appear more attractive to
many couples than legal marriage. Unlike marriage, where the sta-
tus-contract is imposed upon the couple by the state, the cohabita-
tion agreement could be negotiated by the parties and molded to
suit their individual needs and desires. The attractiveness of such
an arrangement, particularly in light of the current atmosphere of
lessened social sanctions against nonmarital cohabitation, may en-
courage nonmarital cohabitation. Such a result would lessen the
state's ability to control family relations between those who are in
all respects, other than legally married, husband and wife.
On the other hand, although the limited application of the mer-
etricious spouse rule results in uncertainty in the rights of recov-
ery of cohabitors, it also provides flexibility in determining
amounts of recovery. Due to the equities which may well exist in
favor of one party to the relationship, this flexibility may be impor-
tant in assuring that recoveries accord with the factual circum-
stances of each case.
The use of the meretricious spouse rule in a limited form there-
fore seems to provide the best solution to a difficult balancing of
105. Commentators have cited the permanence of the relationship and the mutual
commitment of the parties as important factors in determining whether prop-
erty rights should be granted to meretricious spouses, since the more firm the
commitment, the more likely it will be that the granting of rights will accord
with the expectations of the parties. See Zuckerman, supra note 41, at 255;
Comment, supra note 13, at 505-08.
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two important interests: (1) the interest in encouraging legal mar-
riage, and (2) the interest in promoting equitable results. Both in-
terests are protected by the flexibility of recovery. The uncertainty
of recovery makes cohabitation agreements not overly attractive as
an alternative to marriage. However, flexibility ensures that the
amount of recovery will accord with the equity of the factual
circumstances.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
UNMARRIED COHABITORS IN NEBRASKA
In Kinkenon v. Hue,l06 the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized
the right of a meretricious spouse to recover on an express oral
agreement. The plaintiff and the defendant in this case had lived
together for over six years without marrying. During this period,
the plaintiff provided household and nursing services to the de-
fendant and aided in the operation of the defendant's farm. The
plaintiff claimed an entitlement to a life estate in a house built on
the defendant's property during the relationship on the basis of an
express oral agreement between the parties that, in exchange for
the plaintiff's services, the defendant would take care of the plain-
tiff for the rest of her life.107
The court held that despite admitted sexual relations between
the parties, sexual services did not form the basis of the agree-
ment; therefore, the enforcement of the agreement did not violate
public policy.108 Additionally, the court found that although the
contract was oral, part performance by the plaintiff had taken the
agreement outside the Statute of Frauds, and the agreement was
therefore enforceable despite the lack of a writing.109 The defend-
ant was ordered to pay the plaintiff the value of the plaintiffs life
estate in the house.11O
The Kinkenon case marked the first recognition in Nebraska
that an unmarried cohabitor may enforce property rights based
upon an express oral agreement."' It is thus apparent that the
Nebraska courts will follow the Marvin line of cases which recog-
nize the enforceability of express oral agreements between unmar-
ried cohabitors. However, the Kinkenon decision did not address
106. 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981).
107. Id. at 699-700, 301 N.W.2d at 79. The plaintiff also claimed joint ownership of
property held in the name of both parties. Id. at 699, 301 N.W.2d at 78-79.
108. Id. at 704, 301 N.W.2d at 81.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. However, in 1979, the Nebraska Supreme Court allowed recovery under a re-
sulting trust theory where the parties had had an intimate relationship, but
had never cohabited. Taylor v. Frost, 202 Neb. 652, 276 N.W.2d 656 (1979).
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the issue of whether implied-in-law theories of recovery for a mer-
etricious spouse will be recognized in Nebraska. It is therefore un-
clear whether such theories of recovery will be successful in
Nebraska.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Differences in state laws regarding family relations tend to in-
fluence the potential rights of recovery of meretricious spouses in
the various states. Because the recognition of a right of recovery
may have a major influence on public policy concerns, the courts
are reluctant to recognize a cohabitor's rights where the court de-
termines that such recognition will interfere with legislative pre-
rogatives in the area of marital relations.
Of major concern to the judiciary is the avoidance of rendering
decisions which run counter to expressed legislative intent and
policy. In inquiring into legislative policy, courts tend to examine
the status of the law in three specific areas: (1) divorce law,
(2) common-law marriage, and (3) fornication statutes. Rights of
meretricious spouses have been recognized as according with leg-
islative policies in these areas.112 Hence, legislative action is
sometimes viewed as an indicator of the propriety of judicial action
in granting rights to meretricious spouses, or as justification for
making new inroads in the enforcement of such rights.113
Legislative action or inaction has also been utilized as proper
grounds for the denial of recovery for meretricious spouses." 4 If
legislative action indicates an intent to uphold the traditional fam-
ily structure, in contrast to condoning or ignoring sexual and fam-
ily relations outside of marriage, courts are reluctant to recognize
rights which may run counter to what seems to be express legisla-
tive policy.
112. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973)
(citing divorce and property division laws); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J.
378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (stating that since the New Jersey fornication statute
had been declared unconstitutional in 1977, there was no legal impediment to
the parties cohabiting); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976)
(citing the repeal of Oregon's fornication and cohabitation statutes).
113. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
In Cary, the court cited recent changes in state laws concerning the division
of property upon divorce as grounds for extending rights under those laws to
nonmarital cohabitors. Id at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
114. See, e.g., Stevens v. Anderson, 75 Ariz. 331, 256 P.2d 712 (1953) (citing the ille-
gality of fornication in Arizona); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 E1L 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204
(1979) (citing requirement of fault grounds for divorce, prohibition of com-
mon-law marriages, and fornication statute); Naimo v. La Fianza, 146 N.J.
Super. 362, 369 A-2d 987 (Ch. Div. 1976) (citing the illegality of adultery in New
Jersey); Bracken v. Bracken, 45 S.D. 430, 188 N.W. 46 (1922) (citing the fact
that cohabitation was criminal).
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For example, in Hewitt v. Hewitt,115 the Illinois Supreme Court
denied recovery to a meretricious spouse based on the rationale
that the determination of rights between meretricious spouses was
a legislative, not a judicial decision, particularly in view of recent
legislative action." 6 In this case, a woman sued a meretricious
spouse with whom she had cohabited for fifteen years, seeking to
recover an equal share of the properties accumulated by the par-
ties during their relationship. The plaintiff had provided house-
hold services throughout most of the years of cohabitation and had
cared for the three small children born of the union.
Although the equities in Hewitt appeared to require relief for
the plaintiff, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the meretricious
spouse rule to totally bar recovery, stating: "Of substantially
greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the
impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of
marriage.""17 The court cited several public policy concerns as jus-
tification for its decision. First, the court decided that the recogni-
tion of contractual rights of meretricious spouses would weaken
the institution of marriage.ll8 The court examined recently en-
acted state law and determined that the legislative intent was to
strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage."19 The court ex-
pressed concern that recognition of plaintiff's claim would judi-
cially reinstate common-law marriage in Illinois and, therefore,
would run counter to legislative intent. 20
The basis for this concern would appear to be groundless. Al-
though the recognition of property rights of meretricious spouses
may appear to be similar to according marital privileges, the the-
ory under which these rights are asserted-and the remedies sought
are contractual. Thus the basis for recovery is entirely different
than would be recovery for a legally married spouse under similar
circumstances. The property rights of the unmarried cohabitor are
not derived from marital status and are therefore not controlled by
state law governing marital property rights. Rather, they stem
from the intentions of the parties to the relationship.121
115. 77 M11. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
116. Id. at 58-65, 394 N.E.2d at 1208-10.
117. Id. at 58, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
118. Id. at 62, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 62, 394 N.E.2d at 1209-10. A small group of states, including Alabama,
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, as well as the District of Colum-
bia, recognize the validity of common-law marriages. Lorio, supra note 9, at
19 n.109.
121. There is some disagreement among commentators as to whether the recogni-
tion of property rights of meretricious spouses actually amounts to a de facto
recognition of common-law marriage. See Hunter, supra note 16, at 1093 (ar-
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
A second factor cited by the Hewitt court in denying recovery
was that Illinois required an element of fault for divorce.122 The
court found implicit in this requirement an expression of legisla-
tive policy to strengthen the marital institution.123
Finally, the court concluded that recognition of the rights of
meretricious spouses would be contrary to the state public policy
because of the illegality of fornication.124 To allow the recovery of
property rights based upon a contract stemming from an illegal re-
lationship would contravene the state's prohibition of extra-mari-
tal sexual relations. This rationale clearly runs counter to current
trends in the law.125 Particularly in view of the fact that the United
States Supreme Court has recognized some rights of single people
to sexual privacy, 126 this rationale for denying recovery appears
questionable.127
There are two ways in which the law is currently developing in
the area of protecting the rights of meretricious spouses: (1) the
passage of legislation defining the rights of meretricious spouses
similar to those governing the marital relation, and (2) the en-
forcement of cohabitors' rights on a contractual basis. As previ-
ously discussed, a major problem with the contractual approach is
uncertainty in recovery because of the limited application of the
meretricious spouse rule. In addition, the contractual approach
fails to address whether other rights may be accorded to the mere-
tricious spouse, such as workmen's compensation benefits, inheri-
tance rights, causes of action for the wrongful death of a spouse,
social security benefits, and spousal support.128 Other questions
left unanswered by contractual theories include the right of the
unmarried cohabitor to tax benefits upon inheritance 2 9 and the
right to recover attorneys' fees in suits against the meretricious
guing that it does). But see Note, The Old Morality Lives On In Illinois, 56
Cm-KErr L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1979), where the author stated in referring to the
Hewitt decision: "[W] hile the remedy of a property settlement would be the
same in this case for both common law marriage and contract, the actions
have a different basis and can have differing consequences."
122. 77 Il. 2d at 63, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
123. Id. See Note, supra note 68, at 525-30. Only Illinois and North Dakota have
not adopted no-fault divorce. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 401 (1977); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 (1971).
124. 77 Ill. 2d at 59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208.
125. The tendency is toward repealing cohabitation and fornication statutes. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 269(a) (West 1970) (repealed 1975); OI. REV. STAT.
§ 167.010 (Supp. 1969) (repealed 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4505 (Supp.
1971-72) (repealed 1972).
126. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting single per-
sons from obtaining contraceptives held unconstitutional).
127. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 290.
128. See Comment, supra note 13, at 498-99.
129. This issue was addressed in Estate of Edgett, 111 Cal. App. 3d 230, 168 Cal.
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spouse.130
The importance of the interrelationship of legislative policies
and the recognition of property rights of meretricious, spouses sug-
gests that an alternative to contractual theories of recovery may be
statutorily defined rights. Legislation expressly directed at the un-
married cohabitation relationship could both clarify the reason-
able expectations of the parties and aid the courts by outlining
specific legislative policies.
For example, the legislature could create status rights for mere-
tricious spouses similar to those legislatively created for married
spouses.13 1 This result could be accomplished by either including
meretricious spouses under the family law acts or by creating new
legislatively defined status rights for them.
Some states have created status rights for meretricious
spouses, similar to specific rights normally granted to married
spouses, when the equities are in favor of granting such rights.
Oregon, for example, allows a meretricious spouse to collect work-
men's compensation as though the parties had been married, pro-
viding there are children born of the union and the parties lived
together at least one year.132 Similarly, New Hampshire has pro-
tected meretricious spouses from disinheritance by cohabitors
where the parties have lived together for the three years preceding
the death of the cohabitor.133 Particularly with respect to rights
such as these, where the meretricious spouse would not be pro-
tected by the availability of contractual theories of recovery, state
legislatures should at least consider including the meretricious
spouse as a recipient of the status rights accorded to the married
spouse. The legislature could, of course, limit by definition the ex-
tent to which such benefits would apply to meretricious spouses.
Although legislatively extending particular status rights to mer-
etricious spouses may be appropriate in certain circumstances, the
meretricious spouse should not be afforded property rights upon
termination of the relationship based upon a status theory.13 4 To
Rptr. 686 (1980), where the court held that the unmarried cohabitor was an
unrelated person for inheritance tax purposes.
130. In Crowe v. De Gioia, 179 N.J. Super. 36,430 A.2d 251 (1981) the court held that
a meretricious spouse could not recover attorney's fees which were statuto-
rily authorized under similar circumstances for a legally married spouse.
131. Some states have granted putative spouses status rights. See, e.g., CA. CIV.
CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-111 (1973); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 40-1-404 (1979).
132. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.226 (1979).
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1968).
134. Such a creation of status rights as proposed by the Cary decision, see notes
30-32 & accompanying text supra, was rejected by the subseqnent decision of
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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give a meretricious relationship the status of marriage would not
only undermine public policies, but also would be contrary to the
intent of the parties to the relationship.135 It therefore appears
that the contractual analysis, as enunciated in Marvin,13 6 may be
the better approach to the problem of defining the rights of the
meretricious spouse to property acquired during the relationship
upon termination of the relationship. By recognizing property
rights of unmarried cohabitors on a contractual basis, the state
would not put the relationship on a par with legal marriage. Al-
though the amount recovered by the meretricious spouse may in
some cases be equivalent to the type of property settlement to
which a legally married spouse would be entitled, the basis for re-
covery would not be state-created status rights, but contractual
rights, available to all persons under the law.
Another legislative alternative, which may create more cer-
tainty in the determination of the enforceability of property rights
of unmarried cohabitors, would be action similar to that taken re-
cently by the Minnesota legislature.137 The new Minnesota legisla-
tion requires that all contracts between unmarried cohabitors be
in writing and signed by the parties. 38 By designating any con-
tract which does not meet these requirements as void and contrary
to public policy,139 the legislature has effectively circumvented the
argument that part performance has taken such an agreement out
of the Statute of Frauds.
The Minnesota legislation promotes certainty by determining
which contracts between unmarried cohabitors will be enforcea-
ble. In addition, the requirement of a writing should aid the courts
in ascertaining the extent of the rights of recovery under such a
contract. On the other hand, the Minnesota legislation could result
in inequities where there has been an express oral agreement be-
tween the parties on which one party has relied to his detriment.
Unlike other Statute of Frauds provisions, the requirement of a
writing in such a case is not tempered by the doctrine of part
performance.
The state has important interests in regulating the marital rela-
tionship: promoting public morality, ensuring family stability, as-
suring support obligations, and ensuring the proper care of
children.140 To further these policies, traditional marriage rela-
135. See Hunter, supra note 16, at 1094-95; Loi.o, supra note 9, at 30; Zuckerman,
supra note 41, at 279-80.
136. See notes 33-39 & accompanying text supra.
137. MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (Cum. Supp. 1980). For the text of the statutes, see
notes 65 & 66 supra.
138. MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (Cur. Supp. 1980).
139. Id. § 513.076.
140. See Weitzman, supra note 17, at 1241-43.
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tions should be strengthened. However, long and stable
nonmarital unions pose no threat to these social policies. It there-
fore is particularly unjust to deny recovery to meretricious
spouses where the union appears, in all outward respects, to re-
semble the legal marriage relationship.141
Rather than prohibiting recovery by meretricious spouses as a
means of furthering the above policies, perhaps lawmakers should
make marriage a more attractive alternative. 42 There has been
some concern that the recognition of property rights in the mere-
tricious relationship places it in a preferred position over mar-
riage.143 Because marital partners cannot contract concerning the
marital relationship, their relationship lacks the flexibility of a
meretricious one. However, the proper resolution to this problem
may be not in disallowing the meretricious spouse's claim, but
rather, in allowing more flexibility in the marital relationship.
The best alternative to ensure certainty of the rights of meretri-
cious spouses upon termination of the relationship is for the par-
ties to put property in the names of both parties if it is intended to
be jointly owned. In cases where property is held jointly by the
parties, the intent to share in the property is clear and the right of
the meretricious spouse to one-half of the property is generally
upheld.144
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the uncertainty of the legal rights of the parties in a
cohabitation relationship, it is clear that this uncertainty arid, in
some instances, the disallowance of property rights for unmarried
cohabitors, has not discouraged de facto marriages. On the con-
trary, it is widely recognized that nonmarital cohabitation is
increasing.145
Prohibiting recovery by a meretricious spouse is -most detri-
mental when the relationship is of long duration and closely re-
141. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 284-85; Comment, supra note 14, at 723; Note,
supra note 68, at 538-40.
142. Lorio, supra note 9, at 23.
143. See, e.g., Levin & Spak, supra note 77, at 510-15.
144. See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207
Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981).
145. Bruch, supra note 76, at 284; Zuckerman, supra note 41, at 248. Just why
nonmarital cohabitation is increasing is open to speculation. One commenta-
tor posed five possible reasons for the increasing number of persons who co-
habit outside of marriage: (1) marriage is no longer viewed as the only
socially acceptable context for sexual activity, (2) the trend is toward
smaller families and a later age of childbearing, (3) the increased divorce
rate, (4) economic considerations, and (5) disillusionment with the struc-
tures of marriage. Lorio, supra note 9, at 3-5.
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sembles the traditional marital union. The result is that one party
to the relationship suffers greatly, 4 6 while the other party, who is
equally "guilty" of the same conduct, is unjustly enriched.14 7 To
promote equity between the parties to such a relationship, the le-
gal system has an obligation to recognize the existence of the rela-
tionship and, in the proper circumstances, protect the reasonable
expectations of the parties to the extent that legislative policies
will not be undermined.
Wise legal policies should not only promote equity but should
also recognize social realities. Legislative action is suggested as a
means whereby, under appropriate circumstances, certain rights
may be extended to the meretricious spouse. However, legislative
action is not recommended as a means to resolve property dis-
putes upon termination of the meretricious relationship. The bet-
ter approach to the resolution of such disputes is the contractual
approach proposed by Marvin, which balances the policy of en-
couraging legal unions with the policy of promoting equitable re-
sults. In the context of such disputes, the contractual analysis
protects the interests of the parties, without sanctioning
nonmarital cohabitation.
Elisabeth Townsend Davis '81
146. It is generally women who are hurt by the refusal to recognize property rights
of meretricious spouses since the woman's contribution to the union is fre-
quently in a nonmonetary form.
147. See Bruch, supra note 76, at 316; Note, supra note 121, at 1199.
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